Is Europe ready for Trump's pragmatism and a constructive relationship with China?

As the day of Donald Trump's inauguration draws near, Europe is still unsure of how to engage with the new US president, who remains as unpredictable as he was in his first term.

Trump wants a quick resolution to the Ukraine crisis, but at what cost to Europe? With which allies? Most critically, how can peace be ensured over the long run?

At the same time, Europe believes that to further American interests, the incoming president may push trade policies that are especially detrimental to the European continent. After Trump reaffirmed the idea of an American expansion that may, at this point, involve the Panama Canal, Canada and Greenland, this scenario has acquired further traction. Trump has not ruled out using force to accomplish his goals.

How can Europe support Trump's approach to Ukraine in light of these facts and risk being indirectly harmed by his trade policies? Can Europe convince the incoming American president to change his trade orientations in a way that is marginally more advantageous to the Old Continent by exhibiting more accommodative views toward the solution he sees for Ukraine?

The answer is no, which is an uncomfortable fact that no European politician has the guts to publicly admit. Trump intends to find a solution for Ukraine "with or without Europe's contribution," despite the smiles shared in Paris during the December 7 ceremony for the reopening of Notre Dame Cathedral and the last-minute decision to accept President Emmanuel Macron's proposal for a three-way meeting involving the leaders of France, the United States and Ukraine.

Trump highlighted his strong relations with Vladimir Putin and believes he can reach an agreement with him. He also emphasized that China could and should play a role in the negotiations.

Unfortunately, years of anti-Chinese rhetoric make it extremely difficult for Europe, which is far less courageous and pragmatic than Trump's United States, to admit that the new president's assessment is correct, i.e., that no agreement would be considered solid unless China is involved.

Germany appears to prefer ambiguity, whilst Italy, led by Giorgia Meloni, is gaining traction by reminding others of "the opportunity to engage any interested partner in a constructive dialogue." However, most other European countries appear to have positioned themselves as bystanders rather than protagonists in these negotiations. As such, people should not expect their views to be taken into account or the terms of any peace accord to be as reassuring as they may wish.

The sole exception to Europe's inertia appears to be France under Macron. Although he continues to be widely criticized within the internal political spectrum, he appears to be the only one who understands that in order to have a voice, Europe must present itself as both united and autonomous.

Recognizing that such a united and independent territory is a mirage, he strives to address this by emphasizing French pragmatism. He sent his adviser Emmanuel Bonne to Beijing before Christmas and requested that the newly appointed prime minister, François Bayrou, confirm a visit previously booked by his predecessor, Michel Barnier, for January, hoping that this gesture will be acknowledged not just in Europe, but also in China and the United States.

Macron requested Barnier to visit China before visiting Germany or any other European country, which is rare for a European prime minister, and Bayrou was persuaded not to cancel the mission even though his government was still in its early stage. These are strong signs of China's strategic relevance in French (and European) foreign policy.

Macron's regard for China may wind up presenting Europe with one more opportunity to participate in the Ukraine negotiations while also pushing its interests and circumstances. For example, Europe may offer that the contested regions, regardless of which country they are awarded to during the negotiations, be protected by a non-European, non-NATO, but by an international peacekeeping force.

For this strategy to work, it is hoped that other European leaders, even if they are less vociferous or bold than Macron, will support his vision, keeping in mind two essential consequences. First, there is the possibility of profiting from the reconstruction business; second, Europe will be able to discreetly re-establish ties with important markets that may become interesting alternatives to the United States if the latter chooses to pursue a destructive trade policy.

(The author is an independent researcher based in Paris. The views are her own.)