Trump's war on science leaves China in the catbird seat on research and development
A few days ago, I caught up with my old friend Alex, who had just flown back to Shanghai for the first time in six years. Originally from China, Alex moved to the US for graduate school and never left. Now a tenured professor at an American university, he was once animated by the promise of medical breakthroughs and international collaboration.
This time, he seemed uncharacteristically subdued. Over a lukewarm latte in a campus café, he admitted, "If these funding cuts go through, I'm not sure we can even keep the projects alive."
He glanced around the room at students hunched over research books and papers and added with a bitter smile, "Collaboration with Chinese teams? Pretty much off the table these days."

A May 23 photo of Harvard University. The Trump administration ban on Harvard University enrollment of international students has turned Chinese students and researchers worried about their future.
Welcome to the awkward new reality of global science: One superpower is turbocharging its research engine, while the other is pulling out spark plugs.
This war against science waging in the US lies at the feet of President Donald Trump, who has ridiculed scientific knowledge, calling climate change "an expensive hoax" and cutting or abolishing funding in areas such as pandemic research, solar and wind power, and even weather forecasting.
The Trump administration is waging a "wholesale assault on US science" that threatens the country's health, economic development, national security and scientific preeminence, according to an open letter published by nearly 2,000 doctors, scientists and researchers in the US.
Oddly enough, Trump told The Associated Press in 2018, "I have a natural instinct for science."
A tale of two R&D models
The numbers tell a different story. In the United States, federal support for science has become collateral damage in political stoushes. Under the Trump administration, agencies like the National Science Foundation face proposed budget cuts of up to 55 percent.
The US$1 trillion in total spending on US research and development by 2024 mostly came from private companies, not Washington. Public funding remains fragile, subject to election cycles and ideological whiplash.
Meanwhile, China has steadily turned up the dial.
In 2024, it invested over 3.6 trillion yuan (US$500 billion) in research and development, an 8.3 percent increase from the previous year. That's 2.68 percent of the nation's gross domestic product. Perhaps more importantly, spending on basic research that might be deemed too slow or uncertain grew by over 10 percent.
Projections from R&D World suggest that by 2030, China's research and development spending could exceed US$1.45 trillion, leaving the US budget projected US$864 billion trailing far behind. If this were a horse race, the US still has the pedigree but China is the runner with the winning stride.
Consequences of starving science
This isn't just about line items on a spreadsheet. What's at stake is the capacity to develop life-saving drugs, new-energy systems, pandemic responses and frontier artificial intelligence technologies.
In the US, erratic funding has led to hiring freezes, lab layoffs and deep anxiety among early-career scientists. Entire programs are being dismantled midstream. "We're training PhDs to pipette and pivot … to industry," Alex told me dryly.

R&D World's research suggests that by 2030, China could outspend the US on research and development by at least 30 percent, even if the trade war continues, or maybe especially if the trade roars on.
The ripple effects are massive. Cutbacks in basic science today mean fewer breakthroughs tomorrow. The US didn't invent DNA sequencing, the Internet or GPS by accident; they were the fruit of long-term, public-sector investment in a robust research ecosystem. That ecosystem now risks becoming a museum exhibit.
There's an irony here, too. By shrinking its science budget, the US may be unintentionally subsidizing China's ascent. As one analyst told me, "When America steps back, someone else steps forward. Lately, that someone is Beijing."
China's strategic bet
Unlike the US, China doesn't see research as a luxury, but as a strategic pillar of national resilience. It's betting big on quantum computing, biotechnology, space science and AI – not just to boost prestige, but as a buffer against supply chain shocks and tech decoupling.
Its strategy is unmistakably driven from the top down: The government sets direction and channels funds; companies are incentivized to innovate. For the first time, private firms now account for over three-quarters of China's investment in research and development. Most of this targets product development, but basic science is no longer being ignored.
Still, challenges remain. China's research still leans heavily toward applied development over discovery. Duplication of efforts across institutions wastes resources. And while spending is high, quality and originality are uneven.
But the trajectory is clear and the ambition unmistakable.
The vanishing bridge
Perhaps the most tragic subplot in this tale is the slow collapse of US-China scientific collaboration. Once a thriving bridge between the world's two biggest economies, it's now a fraying rope over a canyon of mistrust.
This week brought yet another chilling signal. The Trump administration announced a ban on Harvard University enrolling new international students – a move partly seen as a swipe at institutions with strong academic ties to China.
Harvard, which has long fostered close international partnerships, including with Chinese universities and scholars, now finds itself at the center of an escalating crackdown. Fears grow that scientific exchanges are now being considered a threat.
For decades, joint projects in fields like clean energy, genomics and cancer therapy delivered public goods with global benefits. Today, geopolitical tensions, export restrictions and tightened visa policies are strangling that cooperation.
Scientists find themselves caught in the crossfire. Increasingly, joint research projects between US and Chinese institutions are being quietly shelved, often on legal advice to avoid what some universities call "unnecessary entanglements."
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, over 30 percent of top-tier US international publications involved Chinese collaborators in recent years. That synergy is now rapidly disappearing.

In 2024, China spent 3.6 trillion yuan on research and experimental development, and its R&D intensity reached 2.68 percent – about the same level of US in 2012 and catching up very quickly.
What should China do next?
China's challenge is no longer how much to spend, but how to spend wisely.
First, it needs better internal allocation. Some provinces overspend on lab infrastructure while underperforming on research output. Encouraging inter-regional collaboration and aligning incentives for transfer of technologies would help bridge the gap between lab and market.
Second, China must rebalance its research portfolio. Corporate spending on research and development is growing, but it is still skewed toward development, not discovery. Universities and state institutes often duplicate work, generating inefficiency and institutional inertia.
Third, Beijing should deepen support for public institution research, moving from "made in China" to "discovered in China." It will take more than money; it requires cultural and structural reform.
Why the world should care
A world where China leads in research and development isn't inherently a problem. Science is not a zero-sum game. But a world divided into rival research ecosystems – each siloed, suspicious and politically restricted – is a disaster in the making.
Whether it's confronting pandemics, decarbonizing economies or building trustworthy AI, global problems demand global science. That requires funding, freedom and, most of all, trust.
Science doesn't care about passports. A virus doesn't check visas. A quantum particle doesn't respect borders. If the US wants to lead, it must invest like a leader. If China wants to pioneer, it must look beyond metrics to meaning.
Meanwhile, scientists like Alex are left to wonder whether their next breakthrough will be nurtured or defunded by political headwinds.
"At this point," he told me with a weary sigh, "I just hope my pipettes survive until the end of the fiscal year."
(The author is an adjunct research fellow at the Research Center for Global Public Opinion of China, Shanghai International Studies University, and founding partner of 3am Consulting, a consultancy specializing in global communications. He has no conflict of interests to declare.)
