Two drugs, two strategies, one industry in the middle of rewiring its path to success

Two multibillion-dollar deals in the past month have lit up the biotech world. Both have Chinese origins and involve global pharma betting big on new cures.

The deals involve so-called PD-1/VEGF bispecific antibodies that, in combination with chemotherapy, can be used to treat patients with advanced non-small cell lung cancer. What sets them apart is not the science but the routes taken by Chinese pharma companies in getting their discoveries to market.

On May 20, Pfizer announced a US$6.05 billion licensing agreement with 3SBio, a Chinese pharmaceutical company headquartered in the northeastern city of Shenyang, for its in-house-developed bispecific antibody SSGJ-707. The deal includes US$1.25 billion in upfront cash, up to US$4.8 billion in development and sales, and a US$100 million equity investment in 3SBio.

The deal is not a breakthrough just for its size but for what it skipped. Pfizer didn't work through a US-based biotech intermediary or wait for the molecule to be re-labeled in Boston or San Francisco. It went straight to the originator.

This kind of direct engagement remains rare in cross-border biotech transactions. But it's beginning to look more plausible.

Then came the next big headline.

On June 2, Bristol Myers Squibb announced a licensing deal worth up to US$11.1 billion with Germany's BioNTech. The target? BNT327, another PD-1/VEGF bispecific antibody. But BNT327 didn't originate in Mainz. It was originally known as PM8002, developed by Biotheus, a privately held Chinese biotech based in the southern city of Zhuhai.

Back in 2023, BioNTech licensed PM8002's outside-of-China rights for just US$55 million upfront. By late 2024, it acquired Biotheus outright for US$800 million and folded the drug into its pipeline. Now, less than a year later, BNT327 has been licensed to Bristol Myers at a valuation over 10 times what BioNTech paid to take it global.

In short: One drug went global through the front door. The other passed through a familiar toll booth – a Western biotech intermediary.

This dual-track dynamic raises an interesting question for Chinese pharma innovators: Is it finally time to bypass the middlemen?

For years, the standard playbook read like this: Chinese biotech companies, rich in pipelines but short on cross-border transaction experience, licensed discoveries early to venture capital-backed firms in the US or Europe. These intermediaries bundled the assets in investor-friendly packages, translated data into US Food and Drug Administration-speak, and pitched the molecules to Big Pharma. The Chinese side got early capital; the intermediaries got most of the returns.

It made sense at the time. But today, pipelines in China are maturing. More companies are running global trials, hiring regulatory experts and listing on public markets. The balance of power is shifting.

The 3SBio-Pfizer deal may represent the beginning of a new playbook – one where multinationals go direct to originators, avoiding unnecessary layers of capital markup.

Summit Therapeutics is a case study in what that older model looked like. A US-listed company led by biotech veteran Robert Duggan, Summit holds outside-of-China rights to ivonescimab, a PD-1/VEGF bispecific antibody developed by Akeso, a Chinese biotech company. Summit has been running global Phase 3 trials and was long rumored to be a potential Pfizer partner.

But in the end, Pfizer chose the originator over the intermediary.

None of this suggests that intermediaries are obsolete. BioNTech added real value. It restructured clinical programs, globalized development and positioned BNT327 for success in Western markets. Not every Chinese company is ready, willing or able to do the same.

Still, as more Chinese firms raise capital onshore, partner with seasoned deal advisors, and generate data that speaks for itself, the appeal of middleman-led licensing may diminish. Fewer companies may want to accept early-stage valuations when they could hold out for more lucrative deals later.

Financial advisors in China are already adapting to the new landscape.

China-based firms like Yafo Capital are beginning to redefine the role of financial advisors in biotech licensing.

This March, Yafo played a central role in brokering Novo Nordisk's licensing deal for United Laboratories' triple agonist weight-loss drug program, a rare example of a homegrown pipeline advisor independently steering a major out-licensing agreement to a multinational pharma company, without the need for a Western biotech shell company.

It is a shift from asset packaging to pipeline matchmaking.

There's also a geopolitical undertone to the trend.

As US-China tensions persist, some Chinese biotechs may prefer to work directly with European or other global partner rather than setting up US subsidiaries or going through incorporated US shell companies. Direct licensing offers not just better margins, but potentially fewer regulatory hurdles.

Whether the 3SBio-Pfizer deal becomes the norm remains to be seen. For now, it's an outlier. But it's a potent one, which raises questions about whether the biotech value chain, long dominated by venture capital intermediaries, is starting to flatten.

Two drugs. Two strategies. One industry in the middle of a rewiring.