Early FRROL findings are promising, but interaction is essential

On the first day of 2024, two important laws came into effect in China on its very first day ─ the Foreign State Immunity Law and amendments to the Civil Procedure Law. Both are part of China's broader efforts in recent years to develop its foreign-related rule of law (FRROL) framework, which emphasizes systemic integration and modernization of interfaces between China's domestic legal architecture and international law.

The FRROL refers to the laws, regulations, policies and institutions that govern foreign-related affairs in China. This includes areas like trade, investment, foreign aid, consular protection and international judicial cooperation. While China has had foreign-related laws for decades, it is only in the last few years that there has been a concerted push by the leadership to strengthen and modernize the FRROL framework.

The concept dates back to 2014, when the critical Fourth Plenum Decision called for "strengthening foreign-related legal work" to protect China's sovereignty, security and development interests. In 2018, President Xi Jinping urged China to actively use legal means and occupy the "commanding heights" of the rule of law in external conflicts.

The following year, China's Central Committee for Comprehensively Governing the Country According to Law advocated creating cohesive legal systems that govern the extraterritorial application of Chinese laws.

The primacy of foreign-related rule of law was reinforced in 2020 when President Xi advocated for the "coordinated advancement of the rule of law at home and the rule of law in foreign affairs." This was designated as one of the "11 Upholds" in Xi Jinping's Thought on the Rule of Law.

The Politburo had a group study session on FRROL in November 2023, demonstrating the concept's increased importance in Chinese governance. Xi underlined the significance of speeding the FRROL buildout to rejuvenate the nation and adapt to a changing external scenario. He proposed coordinated efforts across foreign-related laws, law enforcement, the judiciary and legal services to build FRROL systems that meet China's high standard of opening-up to the world.

China's motivation to improve its FRROL capabilities is simple: As reforms promote global connectedness, systematically handling foreign-related concerns through the rule of law becomes more vital and urgent.

China has adopted and amended several laws related to foreign investment, data security, export control, anti-foreign sanctions, foreign state immunity and civil procedure. These changes aim to improve the country's foreign-related legal system, combat unilateralism and long-arm jurisdiction, and facilitate high-standard opening.

The Foreign State Immunity Law repeals foreign states' jurisdictional protection for commercial dealings on the Chinese mainland, permitting Chinese courts to handle a variety of disputes against foreign sovereigns. This move away from absolute immunity shows that Chinese courts are becoming more active against international players.

Meanwhile, the Civil Procedure Law update addresses cross-border jurisdictional uncertainties, offshore evidence collection, foreign court recognition, and other difficulties in strengthening China's private international law architecture. The updated law clarifies and expands Chinese civil adjudication internationally in some domains.

Fast progress is also being made outside of legislation. Chinese government agencies and universities are exploring FRROL-specific education programs. The Supreme People's Court and many Chinese arbitration commissions are collaborating to speed up domestic and foreign-related case resolution. Party statements encourage Chinese enterprises and residents to observe local laws when doing business abroad and to defend their legal rights and interests through FRROL. Chinese delegations are also more involved in key international rule-making committees.

China's FRROL consolidation's jurisdictional reach is broad, and its implementation will be long-term, but some of its early developments are notable and significant. The buildout of coherent FRROL frameworks serves as both a defensive shield against perceived overreach and long-arm jurisdiction by American and certain Western powers into Chinese domestic affairs and a proactive sword offering distinctly Chinese legal solutions for an array of pressing global challenges as China's external political-legal environments worsen.

The FRROL is a methodical Chinese approach to balancing the modern nation-state's dual obligations of successful home governance and positive foreign engagement. What, then, are the key international ramifications of China's determined FRROL acceleration?

First, making FRROL a strategic priority implies that China is engaging in more proactive, organized, and rules-based international involvement based on Chinese socialism. The Chinese government, businesses and society can more assertively invoke FRROL precepts, instruments and mechanisms to legally advance their rights, interests, and disputes abroad, thanks to recent legislation that clarifies jurisdictional underpinnings.

Chinese actors will likely adopt rule-of-law mindsets and litigation-based techniques to preserve their expanding assets and operations abroad, especially as Western governments become more politicized. Frequent, peaceful resolution of transnational commercial and investment disputes in foreign courts and arbitral tribunals will become more common. Chinese entities may also sue foreign private and governmental actors suspected of hurting Chinese interests under FRROL provisions.

Second, by explicitly stressing "FRROL theory" – broadly alternative legal and rule of law thinking with significant Chinese characteristics – China is rapidly mainstreaming its governance paradigm globally across different platforms. For example, Chinese firms operating within the Belt and Road Initiative have pledged to obey local laws, while Chinese experts have actively exported legal models and thinking to their BRI counterparts through cooperative channels.

Such phased promotion of "Chinese legal solutions" is expected to raise international visibility, legal-institutional traction, and normative appeal for Beijing's governance ideology and rule of law paradigm in many developing countries. A composition encapsulating strong state capacity, people-centered development goals, and meritocratic technocratic management can resound across the Global South today.

Finally, solidifying FRROL shows how Beijing is sensibly strengthening its jurisdictional grasp and legal-institutional power to indirectly influence international rules and order at a crucial time. China has a great opportunity to express its views as global governance frameworks face pressure from unconventional security threats and international power shifts. In theory, the FRROL's defensive-assertive duality allows proactivity.

Major powers should not view China's FRROL acceleration as unilateral legal expansionism or 'rule by law' as Western critics are prone to do in times of stress and competition. Instead, it should be seen as a natural progression of China's gradual and systematic efforts to align its socialist domestic legal system with international law, better integrate into global governance, responsibly pursue expanding national development interests, and actively offer Chinese perspectives on shared transnational issues.

Regardless of China's activities, all governments must preserve fair and democratic rule of law internationally and locally. Finally, mutual respect and careful conversation over demagogy or confrontation still offer the surest path to ensuring China's foreign-related rule of law buildout goes smoothly.

FRROL's early findings inspire cautious optimism, but continued engagement is crucial.

(The author is a research fellow with the School of Law, Chongqing University.)