How British government plays 'the China card' tactically

Recently the British government declared that China was responsible for a 2021 cyberattack on the Electoral Commission and proceeded to blacklist a number of individuals of which it accused of hacking and cybercrimes.

The move was notably coordinated with all of the Five Eyes countries, which of course was relayed as mere "concerns" in the Western media narrative but in reality, was an obvious coordinated stunt. In the midst of it all, the extreme anti-China UK MPs of the US NED and "interparliamentary alliance on China" (IPAC) also claimed they had been personally targeted by the alleged cyberattackers.

Although in practice the moves are meaningless, as it produced only the symbolic blacklisting of individuals (the UK even does this to Israeli settlers, as a comparison to show how meaningful it is), it was nonetheless a concerted act of diplomatic and political disapproval in order to tarnish China's image and cater to some other agenda.

There are a number of theories that may explain this sudden and random declaration. After all, one should not be naïve that it took the UK three years to assign "blame" to who they deemed to be the perpetrator, but rather it was politically convenient to do at this specific time.

Chronologically speaking, it is little surprise that the move to attack China came immediately following the imposition of Article 23 legislation in Hong Kong. It seemed an inevitability that Five Eyes countries, which have always attached importance to the region, would retaliate in some way. While unilateral sanctions from the US seemed obvious, and perhaps still on the horizon, the British government has always been unwilling to directly sanction Hong Kong itself due to fears that this may further dilute their influence on the territory.

However, more pressing to the British government is the fact that it must continually appease a loud, annoying and hostile minority of British MPs who seek to undermine its pragmatic, albeit rhetorically provocative, foreign policy on China. The de-facto leader of this group is Iain Duncan Smith, who following Brexit converted his legacy of Eurosceptic rebellion against the Conservative leadership into Sinophobia. If the government is deemed to be too pro-China, he will attempt to incite pushback and give momentum to disruptive bills and proposals.

Because of this, the British government deems it to be in its domestic interests to "throw a bone" to the China hawks in order to appease them and prevent them from dictating the debate. In other words, it gives the impression it is being hawkish on China. Rishi Sunak's government typically emits aggressive rhetoric on Beijing when it is faced with external pressure, either domestically or internationally (from the US) and does not want to be seen as doing nothing amidst the situation in Hong Kong. This is in line with his overall political modus operandi whereby he generally responds to any issue by pushing aggressive right-wing babble.

Therefore, the British government chooses to opportunistically escalate tensions with Beijing at an politically convenient moment to give the appearance of being tough, even if it is thin on action. It similarly did so in 2020 when it blamed Beijing for the COVID-19 pandemic amidst its own disastrous failures.

One telling sign of this strategy is the amount of preparation and coordination which coincides with such decisions. The morning before the announcement, every single Conservative Party aligned right-wing newspaper led with an anti-China story pertaining to the alleged hacking, including The Times, The Telegraph, The Sun, as well as the BBC and Sky News on a broadcasting level. These outlets are little more than mouthpieces for the government's agenda and frequently harbor such leaks through informal ties between government and editors.

The result was that the British government orchestrated an act of political theater in blaming China for the hack, three years after it happened, to serve their domestic and foreign policy goals. It might be added that this year is an election year in Britain, whether the government likes it or not, and all polls point toward the Conservatives facing a clear-cut colossal defeat. While British voters care little about China as a factor, if at all, it might be added they do not want to experience a right-wing rebellion at this particular time and to appear weak, especially on the issue of Hong Kong.

Downing Street could have very easily kept the hack under the carpet and never mentioned it again, but in this case it deemed political gain for itself to play "the China card" and that is simply how the game works.

(The author, a postgraduate student of Chinese studies at Oxford University, is an English analyst on international relations. The views are his own.)